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DISORDERLY AND DISCRIMINATORY: THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE’S TREATMENT OF DISABLED DEBTORS
ABSTRACT
Disability benefits in bankruptcy face uncertainty under the current
exemption system. The enumerated federal exemptions are poorly drafted, lack
useful legislative history, and classify benefits depending on the benefit’s source.
The opt out provision found in section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows
jurisdictions to limit debtors to the state’s exemptions rather than the federal
exemptions. Depending on which exemption the court places the disability
benefits under, the benefits may be fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate,
limited to the amount reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support, or
unexempt. The bankruptcy courts struggle to uniformly apply the federal and
state exemptions, resulting in three main issues. First is the classification of the
disability benefits, which determines if the benefit will be fully exempt, unexempt,
or partially exempt. Second is the poorly drafted federal exemptions create
temporal issues for disability benefits, including past benefits and the right to
future benefits. Third is the courts’ struggle with the form of the disability
benefits, especially if the benefit is not cash, and struggle to decide whether the
exemptions also cover funds deposited and goods purchased with the funds.
This Comment proposes several amendments to the Code to combat the three
main issues for disability benefits: first, defining the term disability benefit in
section 101 of the Code; second, redrafting the exemptions in section 522; and
third, eliminating the opt out provision solely for disability benefits in section
522(b). Finally, the proposed system is directly compared with the current
exemption system, demonstrating the proposed system’s equity and ease of
application.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an ordinary man named Joe. Joe worked a blue-collar job for years
and was injured at the workplace. Although Joe received disability payments
through his job, he was unable to return to work due to his injuries. Joe began to
fall behind on his mortgage. Joe accumulated credit card debt paying for basic
necessities. Faced with hounding creditors, Joe turned to bankruptcy and filed a
chapter 7 case. Joe soon finds out his only source of income––the disability
payments he received from his employer––are being reduced by the court to pay
off creditors. As Joe is waiting outside the courthouse, he bumps into an old
friend, Bob. Bob has also filed for bankruptcy following a workplace injury. Bob
was awarded Social Security Disability Income (SSDI). Bob tells Joe that his
SSDI is not available to his creditors. In disbelief, Joe calls up his friend Suzy
from a few states over and finds out she is in the exact same situation; however,
she gets to keep all of her private disability payments. This unfair situation
occurred because the Bankruptcy Code allows for the inequitable treatment of
disabled individual debtors depending on where the debtor resides and the form
of disability received.
The Code discriminates against disabled debtors in several ways. First, the
Code allows for states to “opt out” of the enumerated federal bankruptcy
exemptions, which results in different results in different jurisdictions. Second,
the Code and various state laws classify disability payments differently
depending on their source. For example, social security, a private disability
policy, a worker’s compensation award, and personal bodily injury are all
classified differently. This classification determines whether the payments are
exempt in full, partially exempt, or not exempt at all.
This Comment will explore the harsh realities that disabled debtors face as
courts struggle to apply the exemptions in section 522(d) and applicable state
law to determine whether the debtor’s disability payments are entirely exempt,
partially exempt, or nonexempt.1 This Comment will first demonstrate the
conflicting applications of the current exemption system. Next, this Comment
will propose several amendments to rectify the issues. Finally, this Comment
will demonstrate the equity of the proposed system by directly comparing it to
the current exemption system.
Section 522(d) lists the exemptions from the bankruptcy estate for individual
debtors.2 This Comment will discuss the following exemptions in detail: section
1
2

11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2019).
Id.
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522(d)(10)(A) (the “SSDI Exemption”), which exempts from creditors the
debtor’s right to receive a social security benefit;3 section 522(d)(10)(C) (the
“Disability Exemption”), which exempts from creditors the debtor’s right to
receive “a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;”4 section 522(d)(10)(E)
(the “Contract Exemption”), which exempts from creditors the debtor’s right to
receive “payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability” to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor;5 section 522(d)(11)(D) (the “Personal
Injury Exemption”), which exempts from creditors payment, “not to exceed
$25,150, on account of personal bodily injury;”6 and section 522(d)(11)(E) (the
“Future Earnings Exemption”), which exempts from creditors the debtor’s right
to receive, or property that is traceable to, “a payment in compensation of loss
of future earning of the debtor . . . to the extent reasonably necessary for support
of the debtor . . . .”7 While these separate Code provisions seem simple, each
may cover a disability benefit or payment depending on how the debtor receives
the payments. As one court notes “parsing exemption claims concerning lost
income disability payments is like hacking one’s way through a thicket.”8
The confusion does not end with the enumerated federal bankruptcy
exemptions. Section 522(b) allows for the debtor to choose between the
exemptions enumerated in section 522(d) and the exemptions under state law.9
If a state chooses, it may expressly limit debtors to the exemptions available
under state law. This option, notoriously called the “opt-out” provision, has been
a source of controversy since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.10 Thirty-five
states have “opted out” under section 522(b) and only allow debtors to use state
law exemptions.11 The remaining fifteen states and the District of Columbia
allow debtors to choose between the federal exemptions and state law
exemptions.12

3

Id. § 522(d)(10)(A).
Id. § 522(d)(10)(C).
5
Id. § 522(d)(10)(E).
6
Id. § 522(d)(11)(D).
7
Id. § 522(d)(11)(E).
8
In re de Kleinman, 172 B.R. 764, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
9
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (“If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to
render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under
subsection (d)”).
10
The Honorable William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption
Limitations: The “Opt-Out” as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 159 (1997).
11
See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.02[1] & n. 3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
12
See id.
4
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BACKGROUND

This Section will explore the origins and purposes of exemptions, the history
of the federal exemption opt-out scheme, and the dated judicial basis for the lack
of personal uniformity in the bankruptcy courts, which injures and discriminates
against disabled debtors. Since the beginning of bankruptcy law, debtors have
been able to exempt a portion of their property from the bankruptcy estate and
the reach of creditors.13 The “purpose of an exemption is to protect a debtor and
his family against absolute want,”14 preserving the fresh start.15 Although only
mentioned once in the Code, the fresh start strives to separate debtors from their
pre-bankruptcy life and allow them to successfully reenter the economic
sphere.16 Exemptions from the bankruptcy estate serve “to facilitate a debtor’s
‘fresh start’ by allowing retention of sufficient resources to sustain basic needs;
creditors are entitled to the balance, if any.”17 Exemptions are only available to
individual debtors.18
When the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was
created, it criticized allowing states to use their own exemptions, calling the
system “intolerable for what is supposed to be a national, uniform system and
destructive to the goal of rehabilitation of individual debtors.”19 The
Commission advised eliminating the state exemption scheme in favor of a single
federal list of exemptions.20 The Senate’s bill reflected the Commission’s
recommendations and did not offer an opt-out for states, but the House version
did.21 Ultimately, a compromise was reached and the House version was adopted
with the lower exemption dollar amounts the Senate bill contained.22
The Constitution grants Congress the exclusive authority to establish
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”23
13

See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 237–38

(1918).
14

Medill v. State, 477 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 1991).
See generally Jonathon S. Byington, The Fresh Start Canon, 69 FLA. L. REV. 115, 115 (2017) (“A
primary policy of bankruptcy law is to give consumer debtors a ‘fresh start’ by discharging their debt”).
16
See generally id. at 116 (noting that bankruptcy provides “a debtor ‘a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.’”) (citing Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
17
In re Wegrzyn, 291 B.R. 2, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
18
11 U.S.C § 522(b)(1) (2019).
19
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 169 (1973). Congress established a Commission on Bankruptcy Laws to
consider amending the disability structure in the Code. Id.
20
Id.
21
See S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 522 (1978); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 522 (1978).
22
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 522 (1978) (enacted).
23
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15
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While this clause seems straightforward, “[a]ny such simplistic reading of the
Bankruptcy Clause has not proven correct, especially in the area of
exemptions.”24 Interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Supreme Court held
in Hanover National Bank that the Bankruptcy Clause does not require personal
uniformity, only geographical uniformity.25 Hanover National Bank allows
states to draft their own exemptions without violating the Bankruptcy Clause.
However, the Supreme Court has yet to interpret the current Code to determine
whether Hanover National Bank is still good law.
There are numerous definitions of disability. For example, the U.S. Census
defines disability to include deafness, blindness, inability to perform one or more
of the functional activities, use of wheelchair, needing assistance of another to
perform daily functions, having difficulty finding and obtaining a job,
Alzheimer’s, developmental delay, intellectual disability, and frequent mental
health problems.26 As of June 2020, disabled individuals account for 12.9% of
the beneficiaries of Social Security.27 As of December 2018, approximately 10
million disabled workers, spouses of disabled workers, and children of disabled
workers received an average of $1,096.99 monthly in benefits.28 While no clear
statistics exist for the number of disabled individuals filing for bankruptcy, in
2010 approximately one in five Americans lived with a disability29 and
approximately one in ten Americans have a severe disability.30 Bankruptcy
filings vary by state, from 0.55 of out 1,000 residents to 5.4 out of 1,000
residents.31 While these statistics may suggest that there are not many disabled
individuals that go through bankruptcy, those that do file for bankruptcy relief
have an extremely difficult time––especially considering that the debtor is
unsure how the court will treat his disability payments that may be his sole
source of income.

24

Brown, supra note 10, at 171.
See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188–89 (1902).
26
See id. at 1–3.
27
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: DISABILITY BENEFICIARIES, https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
ProgData/icp.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
28
December 2018 Disability Statistics, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, https://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/ProgData/icp.html (type December in the month field and 2018 in the year field; then click GO) (last
visited Jan. 10, 2021).
29
MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010 HOUSEHOLD
ECONOMIC STUDIES 4 (2012).
30
See id. at 1–3.
31
Lyle Daly, Personal Bankruptcy Statistics for 2020, THE ASCENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.fool.
com/the-ascent/research/personal-bankruptcy-statistics/.
25
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II. PROOF OF CLAIM
This Section will explore the three main issues that arise for all disability
benefits. The first Subsection covers courts’ confusion on where to place
different versions of disability benefits under section 522 despite the enumerated
federal exemptions and state law exemptions. The second Subsection will cover
temporal issues with all versions of disability benefits and detail some state law
exemption issues. The third and final Subsection will cover issues based on the
form of the disability payment. Disability benefits come in many forms outside
of cash payments, adding confusion for courts. Ultimately, this Section will
demonstrate that disabled debtors are unfairly discriminated against based on
their form of disability benefit and jurisdiction.
A. First Issue: Classification of the Disability Benefit
The main problem disabled debtors face is classification of their benefits.
Because classification will determine if the benefits are exempt in full, partially
exempt, or unexempt, it is an extremely important issue. Courts generally cannot
decide which disability benefit should be placed under which exemption because
the “four subsections share a common theme: each enumerated benefit or right
to payment is based upon a condition of the recipient typically associated with
immediate need.”32
1. Social Security Disability Benefits
Social Security payments, including SSDI, are exempt from the bankruptcy
estate under the SSDI Exemption.33 The exemption includes the right to receive
a social security benefit as a stream of future income. This exemption is also
contained within the Social Security Law itself.34

32
33
34

In re Dale, 252 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000).
Note that all exemptions have been previously defined and cited to the Code. See infra page 399.
The Social Security Act reads:
The right of any person to any future payment under this title shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under
this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to
the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.

42 U.S.C.A. § 407(a) (West).

THATCHER_4.6.21

2021]

4/7/2021 8:46 AM

DISORDERLY AND DISCRIMINATORY

403

2. Private Disability Benefits
Although “there is and should be no distinction between disability benefits
which are publicly provided and those which arise through private contracts,”35
private disability benefits appear to be the subject of two different exemptions.
Private disability benefits can fall under the Disability Exemption, which fully
exempts a debtor’s right to receive “a disability, illness, or unemployment
benefit,”36 or the Contract Exemption which exempts “payment under . . . a
pension . . . annuity . . . or contract on account of illness, disability.”37 Benefits
under the Disability Exemption are fully exempt while benefits under the
Contract Exemption are only exempt to the amount reasonably necessary for the
debtor’s support. While the “use of the term disability benefit in (s)ection
522(d)(10)(C) . . . may also encompass payment under a privately purchased
disability policy,”38 courts generally place this type of award under the Contract
Exemption instead, making the benefit less likely to be exempt.39
The court in Wegrzyn acknowledged “struggle in articulating a meaningful
and consistent method of differentiating between benefits falling under (s)ection
522(d)(10)(C) from those falling under (s)ection 522(d)(10)(E).”40 Yet, another
court noted that “Congress must have intended a distinction between them.”41
As one court noted “payments under privately purchased disability insurance
policies do not fit neatly within” the exemption.42 because “[b]oth subsections
(C) and (E) compensate for disability benefits.”43
The legislative history of section 522(d)(10) does little to remedy the
confusion. The legislative history is as follows:
Paragraph (10) exempts certain benefits that are akin to future earnings
of the debtor. These include social security, unemployment
compensation, or public assistance benefits, veteran’s benefits,
disability, illness, or unemployment benefits, alimony, support, or
separate maintenance (but only to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependents of the debtor), and
benefits under a certain stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity
35

In re Bowen, 458 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. C.D. III. 2011).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C) (2019).
37
Id. § 522(d)(10)(E).
38
Sheehan v. Lincoln Nat. Life, 257 B.R. 449, 455 (N.D. W. Va. 2001); see also In re Morehead, 283
F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2002).
39
See In re Wegrzyn, 291 B.R. 2, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
40
Id. at 6.
41
In re Evans, 29 B.R. 336, 337 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
42
In re Morehead, 283 F.3d at 205.
43
In re Evans, 29 B.R. at 337.
36
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or similar plan based on illness, disability, death, age or length of
service.44

The legislative history fails to distinguish between benefits and payments or
what is fully exempt under each subsection. The legislative history “do[es] not
provide a consistently workable test for identifying benefits qualifying for full
or partial exemption.”45 Further, the distinctions between “public versus private
benefits do not satisfactorily inform the debate.”46
Since the legislative history offers little enlightenment, courts must decide
for themselves where to place a private disability policy. Although not explicitly
said, courts may utilize the Contract Exemption over the Disability Exemption
because private disability policies generally arise out of contract, whether the
policy is provided through the debtor’s work or privately purchased. This
interpretation, however, would render the Disability Exemption superfluous.
Another possible motivation is to offer creditors some chance of repayment. For
example, if a debtor’s sole source of income is a private disability policy and the
debtor can exempt a large portion of the estate using other exemptions available,
unsecured creditors may be left with almost nothing. This could lead to creditors
being less likely to loan money to disabled individuals or charge higher interest
rates.
When a court does place a private disability policy under the Contract
Exemption, it must limit it to an amount “reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor.”47 However, disability expenses may vary wildly from month to
month depending on the debtor’s current health, unexpected expenses, necessary
treatments, and therapy. In addition, courts look to the age of the debtor in
deciding whether to even allow an exemption. “The young debtor has been
denied an exemption” because they have more time to earn money.48 While for
“the elderly debtor, where no future earning capacity exists, the exemption is
allowed.”49
State law issues involving exemptions may arise as well. For example, New
Hampshire law fully exempts periodic payments, including disability payments,
from bankruptcy proceedings.50 When a debtor attempted to exempt her

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 362 (1977).
In re Wegrzyn, 291 B.R. at 7.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2019).
In re Bari, 43 B.R. 253, 256 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
Id.
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 167:25 (“All assistance given hereunder shall be inalienable by any
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payments using the state exemption, the court analogized instead to the federal
exemptions.51 The court held that under federal law, the disability payment
would be classified under the Contract Exemption, not the Disability Exemption.
Therefore, the debtor’s payments had to be limited, even under New Hampshire
law.52 Under North Carolina law, an opt-out state, “[t]he court or judge may
order any property . . . to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment”53
but creates an exemption for “the earnings of the debtor for his personal services
. . . when it appears by the debtor’s affidavit or otherwise, that these earnings are
necessary for the use of a family supported wholly or partly by his labor.”54 In
one case, a debtor in North Carolina received $2,262.00 a month from a private
disability insurance after injury.55 The court concluded that the debtor could not
exempt the disability insurance payments at issue because they “result[ed] from
a contractual right to payment based on the happening of a fortuitous event”56
and “are paid as a result of nonperformance rather than performance . . . .”57 The
payments were not considered earnings necessary for the debtor’s and his
family’s support.
In conclusion, debtors with private disability policies face uncertainty in
bankruptcy. Disabled debtors can be discriminated against due to a lack of clear
legislative history, varied placement under the Disability Exemption or the
Contract Exemption, and state law issues adding to the confusion.
3. Worker’s Compensation
Debtors receiving worker’s compensation as a substitute for wages face
similar issues as debtors with private disability policies. “As is the case with
privately funded disability payment plans, exemption of worker’s compensation
benefits appears the subject of more than one subsection.”58 Courts generally
place the award under the Disability Exemption.59 However, a minority of
assignment or transfer and shall be exempt from levy or execution under laws of this state including periodic
payments on any judgment of any kind”).
51
In re Valentine, No. 08-12074-JMD, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3192, at *10–11, *21, *23 (Bankr. D.N.H.
Oct. 14, 2009).
52
Id. at *12.
53
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-362.
54
Id.
55
See In re Dillon, No. 05-10428C-7D, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1314, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. July 8, 2005).
56
Id. at *3.
57
Id. at *4.
58
In re Wegrzyn, 291 B.R. 2, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
59
See, e.g., In re Cain, 91 B.R. 182, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (“three different subsections of the
exemptions could arguably be applied to Workers’ Compensation benefits”); In re Holstine, No. 11-14573, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97323, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 15, 2012) (“Holstine’s award falls within the text of both
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jurisdictions place worker’s compensation under the Future Earnings Exemption
which exempts, but limits, a debtor’s right to receive a payment in compensation
of loss of future earnings of the debtor.60
Due to the equitable nature of worker’s compensation awards, the payments
are usually placed under the Disability Exemption over the Future Earnings
Exemption so that the awards can be fully exempt. Similar to private disability
benefits, courts use the legislative history of section 522 when deciding where
to place the award. One court articulated the distinction between the legislative
history of section 522(d)(10), which focuses on benefits that are akin to future
earnings of the debtor and compared it to the legislative history of section
522(d)(11), which focuses on compensation for losses.61 Section 522(d)(10)
exempts certain benefits that are “akin to future earnings of the debtor” while
section 522(d)(11) “allows the debtor to exempt certain compensation for
losses.”62
Another court, expanding on the legislative history reasoned that
“paragraphs (11)(D) & (E) deal with recoveries for losses, which in some
instances, could be hundreds of thousands of dollars and greatly exceed an
amount reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor . . . .”63 Workers’
compensation covers medical bills and compensates the employee according to
the employee’s weekly pay but does not include punitive or pain and suffering
damages like tort awards may, therefore it is usually already set at an amount
reasonably necessary for support.64 Workers’ compensation benefits are
designed “only to prevent the individual from becoming destitute.”65 Since
workers’ compensation covers the debtor’s inability to continue working at their
previously employed levels and are based on the debtor’s original wage, they
are more similar to “future earnings of the debtor.”66 Workers’ compensation
aims to help injured employees “whose ability to generate future earnings has
been reduced, or as in this case, completely lost because of a work related
injury.”67

§ 522(d)(10)(C) and § 522(d)(11)(E). It can be readily characterized as either ‘property that is traceable to . . .
payment in compensation of loss of [Holstine’s] future earnings’ or as ‘a disability, illness or unemployment
benefit.’”).
60
See supra page 399.
61
See In re Evans, 29 B.R. 336, 337 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
62
Id. (emphasis in original).
63
In re LaBelle, 18 B.R. 169, 170 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
64
See In re Thomas, No. 4-89-6305, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1020, at *6–7 (Bankr. D. Minn. May 11, 1990).
65
In re Evans, 29 B.R. at 338.
66
In re LaBelle, 18 B.R. at 171.
67
Id.
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This legislative history and equitable interpretation extends to state law
exemptions. Interpreting New York law identical to the Disability Exemption, a
court ruled a worker’s compensation award was exempt as a disability benefit
rather than as a compensation award.68 The court reasoned that the absence of
New York legislative history points to disability benefits encompassing
workers’ compensation awards even though a debtor may end up receiving a
head start.69 The court explained that a head start is possible if an individual with
a pending workers’ compensation claim files for bankruptcy, receives a
discharge of any prepetition living expenses, and then receives a post-discharge
reward that covers prepetition expenses.70 This timing allows the “indebtedness
to be discharged while permitting the debtor to retain the prepetition
benefits . . . .”71
Courts generally view the Disability Exemption and the Future Earnings
Exemption as mutually exclusive.72 A court has noted that Congress cannot have
intended for workers’ compensation awards to fit under both the Disability
Exemption, which is an unlimited exemption, and the Future Earnings
exemption, which must be reduced to the amount reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor.73 One court’s early interpretation of workers’
compensation exemptions disagreed with this logic, splitting the award and
fitting it under both the Disability Exemption and the Future Earnings
exemption.74 This court placed the portion of the award that represented the
debtor’s accrued disability while waiting for the case to settle as exempt under
the Disability Exemption and placed the remainder of the award under the Future
Earnings Exemption, since it represented a right to receive compensation for loss
of future earnings.75 Although very few courts have agreed with this line of

68
See In re Herald, 294 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Section 282.2.(c) of the DCL that is
identical to the exemption provision set forth in Section 522(d)(10)”); see N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 282
(McKinney).
69
In re Herald, 294 B.R. at 447–48.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 447 (punctuation omitted).
72
See generally In re Nielsen, 401 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009) (workers’ compensation award
exempt under Disability Exemption only); In re Cain, 91 B.R. 182 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (same); In re Herald,
294 B.R. at 440 (workers’ compensation award exempt under New York equivalent of Disability Exemption);
In re Thomas, No. 4-89-6305, 1990 WL 62438, at *2 (Bankr. D. Minn. May 11, 1990) (lump sum workers’
compensation award exempt under the Future Earnings Exemption only); In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. 342 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 2007) (same).
73
See In re McClure, 175 B.R. 21, 22 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying Illinois exemptions and discussing
federal exemptions).
74
In re Lambert, 9 B.R. 799, 800–01 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (“[n]o cases have been decided under
the above exemption provisions”).
75
Id. at 800.
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reasoning, one court stated there is “no indication that [debtors] are restricted to
alternatives when a debtor receives two different payments for a single injury.”76
A workers’ compensation reward can be denied any exemption. In a
noteworthy case, the court refused to exempt a workers’ compensation lump
sum award of $42,000 that had been segregated and set aside one year prior to
the bankruptcy filing.77 The court reasoned that the award did not fall within the
Future Earnings Exemption because that exemption only covers “compensation
received in the nature of tort liability.”78 While the court noted that there was
influential precedent to place the award under the Disability Exemption, the fact
that the award was already distributed meant that it did not fall within the
language of the exemption excluding a “debtor’s right to receive.”79 The court
was especially critical of the language in the Disability Exemption that lacks
language similar to “property that is traceable” found in the Future Earnings
Exemption.80 The court noted the Disability Exemption “does not go the extra
step and exempt property that is traceable from the original workmen’s
compensation award,”81 so the award in the case at hand could not be classified
under the Disability Exemption. The court reasoned that “a right to claim an
exemption is a statutory right and is not derived from equitable considerations”82
because if an “exemption is not allowed by statute, it not allowable.”83
A workers’ compensation award can be denied any exemption under the
Disability Exemption, the Future Earnings Exemption, and the New York state
law equivalent if the award has been partially spent and comingled with other
funds.84 The court reasoned that the New York law, like the Disability
Exemption, does not include property that is traceable to the award.85 The court
noted that the New York legislature “limited the exemption provided for under
(s)ections 5205(l) and (l)(2), to Workers’ Compensation funds received by direct
or electronic deposit within forty-five days of filing. . . .”86

76

In re Bishop, No. 95-82479, 1996 WL 33401350, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1996).
See In re Michael, 262 B.R. 296, 297 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001).
78
Id.
79
See id. at 298. In effect, because the award had already been paid out as tort damages, it was not a
future earning. Id.
80
Id. (comparing 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(C)(10) (2019) with id. § 522(d)(11)(E)).
81
In re Michael, 262 B.R. at 299.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
In re Wydner, 454 B.R. 565, 568 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011).
85
Id. at 573.
86
Id.
77
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In conclusion, debtors receiving a worker’s compensation award face
uncertainty in bankruptcy. Depending on the court and the circumstances, the
award may be placed under the Disability Exemption or the Future Earnings
Exemption, both exemptions, or neither exemption.
4. Personal Injury
Like private disability policies and workers’ compensation, personal injury
awards may fall under two different exemptions. The statute calls for courts to
place personal injury awards under the Personal Injury Exemption which
exempts the debtor’s payment, “not to exceed $25,150, on account of personal
bodily injury” or under the Future Earnings Exemption as payment in
compensation of loss of future earnings.87 Personal injury is different from
private disability and worker’s compensation because it does not serve to
directly benefit a disabled worker but rather “to make the injured person whole
by serving as the monetary equivalent of the harm suffered”88 and make the
“injured debtor whole in the eyes of the law.”89 The exemption covers a tort
remedy, rather than a right arising from contract like workers’ compensation or
private disability benefits.90
Courts usually place personal injury awards under the Personal Injury
Exemption because it is the most straightforward interpretation of the Code.91
Under the Personal Injury Exemption, the award must be reduced. Due to the
nature of a tort award, a court may look to the different damages the debtor
received.92 General damages usually cover “temporary or permanent physical
and mental loss or impairment, including lost future earning capacity; pain and
suffering, including that reasonably certain to occur in the future; mental
suffering, including that reasonably certain to occur in the future; and future
medical costs reasonably certain to occur.”93 Special damages instead cover
quantifiable losses, which are usually expenses that are discharged in

87
11 U.S.C. 522(b)(11)(D); see generally In re Chavis, 207 B.R. 845 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997) (award
placed under Personal Injury Exemption).
88
In re Bailey, 84 B.R. 608, 610 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
89
In re Butcher, 189 B.R. 357, 365 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995), aff’d, 125 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 1997).
90
See In re Chesley, 526 B.R. 888, 894 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
91
See In re Buchholz, 144 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992); In re Chavis, 207 B.R. at 849; In re
Chesley, 526 B.R. at 895; In re Haynes, 146 B.R. 779, 781 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992); Kollar v. Miller, 176 F.3d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Mercer v. Monzack, 170 B.R. 759, 763 (D.R.I. 1994), aff’d, 53 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).
92
But see In re Mercer, 158 B.R. 886, 889 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) (court considers debtor’s testimony and
letter from treating physician on debtor’s disability when the debtor’s $50,000 award was not broken down by
damages).
93
In re Bailey, 84 B.R. at 610.
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bankruptcy.94 Because of this distinction, the portion of the award that represents
general damages should not be limited, but the portion of the award that
represents special damages should be limited to avoid giving debtors a head start
rather than a fresh start.95
Although the personal injury awards must be reduced, courts recognize that
“personal injury. . . deals . . . with human capital” and that bankruptcy should
protect it because a “debtor who suffers serious personal injury is deprived of
using his or her human capital in getting a fresh start.”96 Courts have considered
“age, present employment, future employment prospects, and general health” of
the debtor when limiting the award to a reasonably necessary amount.97
Additionally, courts must limit the award to account for the debtor’s basic needs
but “not to maintain the debtor’s present lifestyle.”98 This balance protects both
debtors and creditors by protecting the fresh start, but also preventing debtors
from exempting massive awards when discharging prepetition debt.99
A court may also split the personal injury award into two different
components, classifying the punitive piece under the Personal Injury Exemption
and the remaining under the Future Earnings Exemption.100 The court reduces
the punitive piece of the award, or the special damages but allows the portion of
the award to compensate for lost wages to be exempt.101 A unique situation that
arises in personal injury is the possibility of multiple awards. If the debtor suffers
separate injuries and receives multiple awards, whether the debtor is limited to
exempting a single award or multiple awards is a source of conflict within the
courts.102

94

See Medill v. State, 477 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1991).
See In re Bova, 205 B.R. 467, 477 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
96
Medill, 477 N.W.2d at 708.
97
In re Greenly, 481 B.R. 299, 316 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012).
98
Id.
99
See In re Rauser, 312 B.R. 461, 465 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004) (“pain of tortfeasor’s failure to adequately
insure” was equitably shared between debtor and his creditors).
100
See, e.g., In re Bova, 205 B.R. 467, 477 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Chavis, 207 B.R. 845, 847
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997) (“We note that Debtor is not required to choose one exemption under which to claim all
aspects of a single personal injury award.”). For Personal Injury Exemption definition, see supra page 399.
101
In re Wiley, 184 B.R. 759, 766 (N.D. Iowa 1995); see also In re Daly, 344 B.R. 304, 318 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2005).
102
See In re Daly, 344 B.R. at 313 (debtor who had sustained separate injuries was not limited to single
exemption under Personal Injury Exemption); see also In re Comeaux, 305 B.R. 802, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2003) (same); but see In re Christo, 192 F.3d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (debtor entitled to only a single Personal
Injury Exemption even though the debtor had three pending tort actions for three separate motor vehicle
accidents).
95
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Generally, personal injury awards are classified under the Personal Injury
Exemption and reduced. The court considers the objective facts of the case and
reduces the award accordingly. The award may be split into two categories, one
portion under the Personal Injury Exemption (or a state law equivalent) and
another portion under the Future Earnings Exemption.
Overall, the first issue shows that even with enumerated federal exemptions
for different versions of disability benefits, courts classify awards differently
which confuses debtors. Each type of disability benefit appears to be fit under at
least two different exemptions. Depending on the facts of the case, the
jurisdiction, and the type of disability benefit, the court may place the award in
one exemption or another, split the award and place it under both exemptions,
or place the award under no exemption. Further, state law exemptions only add
to the confusion of an already muddled system. This current system
unacceptably discriminates against disabled debtors based on their source of
disability benefits and jurisdiction.
B. Second Issue: Temporal Limitations on Disability Benefits and Exemptions
Another major issue that arises for disability benefits is the timing of the
award with the commencement of the bankruptcy case. The statutory language
for all disability benefits is ambiguous as to whether the exemption extends to
funds previously paid, whether the funds can be converted into goods and those
goods exempt, and how long the exempt goods retain their exempt status. In
general, disability benefits previously paid out retain their exempt status if the
payments are from SSDI, private disability, or worker’s compensation, but not
personal injury. This practice preserves the fresh start for disabled debtors but
there is some disagreement among the courts. Whether property purchased with
disability proceeds is exempt depends on the type of benefit and how long ago
it was received.
1. Funds Previously Paid
Generally, previously paid disability payments are exempt from the
bankruptcy estate. Most courts follow the “‘general rule’ that depositing exempt
funds into a bank account does not divest those funds of their exempt status.”103
The general rule applies across multiple section 522(d) disability benefits,
including SSDI, worker’s compensation, private disability benefits. However,

103

In re Panza, 219 B.R. 95, 97 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998).
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the general rule does not apply to personal injury.104 “A disability benefit,
(whether periodic or lump-sum payment), is not divested of its character as a
payment in the nature of future earnings simply by virtue of its receipt by the
beneficiary prior to the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.”105 In this view
there are no temporal limitations to disability benefits, simply “[t]he timing of
the payment ought not deprive a recipient of those monies meant to be spent for
his basic care and maintenance by eliminating the recipient’s right to exempt
those funds.”106
The reasons for exempting previously paid benefits include protection for
debtors whose only source of income is disability benefits, protecting the fresh
start, and rewarding debtors who save in anticipation of future large medical
costs. One court reasoned that protecting the benefits allows for “deserving
debtors who are receiving non-wage benefits at the same time they file for
bankruptcy would receive the same treatment as debtors who are employed,”
putting disabled debtors on equal footing even though “the right to receive
payments acts as a substitute for future wages.”107 This protection “permits the
Debtor the opportunity to a fresh start.”108 By exempting previously paid
benefits, debtors avoid becoming destitute following a large medical bill or
expense and rewards debtors who plan financially.
2. Conversion of Disability Benefits
Another temporal issue arises when cash benefits are comingled with other
funds and converted to personal property. For private disability policies under
section 522(d)(10), which includes the SSDI Exemption, the Disability
Exemption, and the Contract Exemption, some courts hold that the exemptions
apply in “pari passu to property that is traceable to that right.”109 Courts reason
that if the award is exempt and put to use by the debtor, the property should be
exempt as well.110 This reasoning protects debtors who have large expenses and
104

See In re Chapman, 177 B.R. 161, 163 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
In re Frazier, 116 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
106
Id.
107
In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242, 253 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012), aff’d sub nom. McFarland v. Wallace, 516
B.R. 665 (S.D. Ga. 2014), aff’d sub nom. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2015).
108
Id.
109
In re Panza, 219 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998); see also In re Ryzner, 208 B.R. 568, 570 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1997) (interpreting Florida law that allows debtors to use exemptions in section 522(d)(10)); In re
Valentine, No. 08-12074-JMD, 2009 WL 3336081, at *8 (Bankr. D.N.H. Oct. 14, 2009) (lump sum disability
settlement would be exempt under section 522 (d)(10)); In re Frazier, 116 B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1990); In re Williams, 171 B.R. 451, 453–54 (D.N.H. 1994) (interpreting New Hampshire law); In re
Greene, 178 B.R. 533, 536 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (interpreting Florida law).
110
In re Williams, 171 B.R. at 454.
105
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must use their disability benefits for their own maintenance and support, rather
than saving.
Courts may disagree with the general rule and hold that once deposited and
converted, the creditors may reach the property that was based on the benefit.111
Courts reason that the exemptions in section 522(d)(10) differ from other
exemptions because it only exempts “a debtor’s right to receive” and does not
include “property that is traceable” like the exemptions found in section
522(d)(11), which includes the Personal Injury Exemption and the Future
Earnings Exemption.112 This line of reasoning shows that debtors could end up
exempting their entire bankruptcy estate if disability benefits were the debtor’s
sole source of income for a long period of time, leaving creditors with no
property or funds for repayment in the bankruptcy estate.113 In an illustrative
case, a debtor tried to exempt $11,233.94 in fur coats because they had been
purchased with disability payments.114 The court disagreed and did not let the
debtor exempt the fur coats.115
3. Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation awards present unique temporal issues. Under the
Future Earnings Exemption debtors may exempt their “right to receive, or
property that is traceable to . . . a payment in compensation of loss of future
earnings.”116 It is unknown whether Congress intended future earnings to be
measured by the date of filing or by the date of the debtor’s claim.117 One court
reasoned that if Congress intended it to be from the petition date, in cases where
the award has not yet been determined, then no portion of the award would be
exempt, defeating the purpose of the exemption.118 In an illustrative case, when
a debtor filed for bankruptcy just prior to receiving a $173,679.49 workers’
compensation award for loss of a hand, the court deemed the entire award
exempt but said it could be exempt under the Disability Exemption or the Future
Earnings Exemption.119

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

In re Panza, 219 B.R. at 96; In re Chapman, 177 B.R. 161, 163 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
In re Panza, 219 B.R. at 97 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10) (2019); id. § 522(d)(11)).
See id. at 95.
Id. at 98.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E).
See In re Herald, 294 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003).
See id.
In re Hanh Hieu Dang, 473 B.R. 218, 221–22 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012).
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Although the Future Earnings Exemption exempts workers’ compensation
awards and “property that is traceable” to the award, the property is not always
exempt.120 As a general matter, when considering whether a debtor’s workers’
compensation award is exempt under this rule, the court tends to favor the
exemption of a recently received award over that of an old award.121 Further,
when a debtor converts his workers’ compensation award into consumer goods,
the court is less likely to exempt the goods obtained through the award’s
conversion than the original award itself.122 In an illustrative case, the court held
that the lump-sum workers’ compensation award that the debtor received four
years prior, and subsequently used to purchase a vehicle and outdoor equipment,
was not exempt under the Future Earnings Exemption.123 The court furthered
that remaining cash from the award that the debtor deposited in a bank account,
but did not spend, was not exempt under the Disability Exemption because the
debtor failed to represent a “right to receive” a disability benefit.124 Thus, both
the goods and the remaining proceeds that the debtor derived from the award
were available to creditors, absent some other possible exemptions.125
State law issues also arise when workers’ compensation awards are
converted into consumer goods. Some states offer more protection than others.
For example, New Hampshire and Illinois state law allow an automobile
purchased with workers’ compensation funds to be exempt,126 while Rhode
Island law does not permit such an exemption.127 As evidenced by these
conflicting standards, the treatment of workers’ compensation awards vary
greatly from state-to-state because state law is, as a whole, an extremely variable
body of rules. As one court aptly explained, although “[s]tatutes exempting
120

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E).
See In re Nielsen, 401 B.R. 149, 150 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009) (court exempts lump sum award received
post-petition, pre-confirmation); Matter of Evans, 29 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983) (pending workers’
compensation award exempt entirely); In re Covey, 36 B.R. 696, 698 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984) (court exempts
lump sum award received three months prior to bankruptcy petition); In re Michael, 262 B.R. 296, 299 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 2001) (court denies exemption to lump sum award received over a year prior to bankruptcy petition);
In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. 342, 361 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007) (court only exempts portion of award received a
year prior to bankruptcy petition).
122
See In re Wydner, 454 B.R. 565, 574 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011) (court denies exemption to debtor who
spent workers’ compensation settlement on items such as a large screen television, elective gastric bypass
surgery, and new carpeting); In re Covey, 36 B.R. at 698 (court exempts segregated lump sum award).
123
In re Williams, 181 B.R. 298, 301–02 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 301.
126
See, e.g., In re Williams, 171 B.R. 451, 452, 454 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that one debtor could exempt
an automobile that was purchased with workers compensation); In re Irwin, 371 B.R. 344, 346 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
2007) (same).
127
See, e.g., In re Bonzey, 153 B.R. 105, 107 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) (holding that once the debtor received
workers’ compensation the exemptions are no longer applicable).
121
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worker’s [sic] compensation benefits from creditors’ claim vary markedly from
state to state . . . judicial interpretation of those laws is even more varied.”128
In summary, all sources of disability benefits face a variety of complex
temporal issues and the lack of clear precedent surrounding the treatment of
these issues only exacerbates confusion for debtors. More specifically, a
disabled debtor’s unique circumstances can affect the court’s treatment of the
debtor––such as (1) the source of the debtor’s disability benefits, (2) whether the
debtor has fully used or converted his or her benefit funds, and (3) how long ago
the debtor received such benefits. This lack of uniformity encourages disabled
debtors to spend their full award payments, rather than engaging in intelligent,
long-term financial planning, because they do not know whether the money that
they save will be exempt.
C. Third Issue: Form of Disability Benefit
The manner in which disability benefits are dispersed can also create issues
for the debtors who rely on such payments to survive. Benefits can take the form
of annuities, pensions, trusts, and insurance policies. Unlike the debtors
receiving this wide array of disability benefits, this issue of inconsistent payment
form does not affect recipients of SSDI, whose disability benefits are always
distributed through a uniform monthly check system. However, the issue does
arise for private disability policies, workers’ compensation, and personal injury.
This Section will demonstrate that the current system unfairly discriminates
against disabled debtors based on the form of their disability benefit.
1. Private Disability Policies
Private disability benefits come in forms including annuities, pensions,
trusts, and insurance policies.129 Courts may place these different benefit
payment policies under the Contract Exemption,130 which allows debtors to
exempt their right to receive “a payment under . . . a pension . . . or similar plan
or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor,” rather than under the

128

In re Nolen, 65 B.R. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1986).
See In re Aubry, 558 B.R. 333, 342 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2016); In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Bowen, 458 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011); In re McQuaid, 492 B.R. 514, 515
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).
130
See supra note 126.
129
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Disability Exemption, because the benefits are more contractual in nature, and
less like a cash disability benefit.131
In a notable case, the court allowed an elderly debtor to fully exempt his
lump sum disability payment, which he opted to receive over a stream of future
payments to pay his ailing wife’s medical bills.132 However, trusts are not
afforded the same preferential treatment as lump sum disability payments. For
example, under Illinois law, debtors could not exempt a special needs trust that
was created through the debtors’ successful lawsuit against a disability insurer
that initially denied payment.133 Because the debtor only claimed the trust under
the exemption under a right to receive disability proceeds and not under any
exemption for already received payments, it was placed in the bankruptcy
estate.134 However, based on the same statute, another court held that a private
disability insurance policy was exempt even though it can be argued the special
needs trust was only created because there was an initial right to receive
disability proceeds.135
2. Workers’ Compensation
A court may place workers’ compensation awards that do not take the form
of cash under the Future Earnings Exemption.136 A court interpreting a Missouri
state statute––which is nearly identical to the Future Earnings Exemption––held
that an annuity purchased on behalf of a debtor for a workers’ compensation
claim had to be limited to the amount reasonably necessary for support, in
contrast to a cash payment made under the Disability Exemption.137 Another
court further reasoned that the debtor may not use the Disability Exemption
when his or her workers’ compensation award has already been deposited.138 In
cases like these, the award instead must be grouped under the Future Earnings
Exemption.139
However, the conclusion that the Disability Exemption falls under the
umbrella of the Future Earnings Exemption has not been upheld by all courts.

131

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2019).
In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
133
In re McQuaid, 492 B.R. 514, 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/121001 (2019) (exempting a debtor’s right to receive “a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit”).
134
In re McQuaid, 492 B.R. at 515–18.
135
In re Bowen, 458 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011)
136
See, e.g., In re Bonuchi, 322 B.R. 868, 874 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
137
Id.; see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.430 (2020).
138
See In re Sanchez, 362 B.R. 342, 357 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007).
139
See In re Arellano, 524 B.R. 615, 618 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2015).
132
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Interpreting California law that is identical to the Code, a court determined that
an annuity paid to a debtor who could not return to work for ten years following
a workplace injury was exempt as a disability benefit, rather than a right to
receive payment.140 Moreover, while lump sum payments may also be an issue,
courts generally hold such payments to be exempt.141 For instance, when a
debtor purchased a certificate of deposit for a workers’ compensation award of
$84,000, distributed as a lump sum, a court deemed the award to be exempt.142
In summary, the form of the disability benefit can affect how the disability
benefit is treated by courts. The form might ultimately impose unfair
discrimination against a debtor who either intentionally selects a certain benefit
type for financial planning purposes or involuntarily gets stuck with a benefit
type that she would not otherwise choose. This discrimination is arbitrary, as the
form of a disability benefit should not affect the status or classification of its
potential exemption.
Overall, three main issues plague disability benefits: (1) confusion as to
where to place the award, (2) temporal constraints and confusion, and (3) form
of the disability payment issues. This current system has led to chaos for disabled
debtors. Will the disability payments be exempt in full, partially, or not all? Will
any saved amounts of the disability benefit be exempt? What if the disability
benefit comes in a different form than a monthly check? All of these answers
depend on the court hearing the case, even in non-opt out states.
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The current exemption system for disability benefits can be amended on
several levels. This Section proposes defining a disability benefit in section 101
of the Code, modifying the opt-out system to eliminate state law exemptions for
disability benefits, and redrafting the troublesome portions of section 522(d).
This Section will then demonstrate how the proposed system aligns with other
Code provisions and other areas of law. Finally, this Section will demonstrate
the equity of the proposed system by comparing it to the current Code.

140
In re Aubry, 558 B.R. 333, 344, 352 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2016); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.140
(West 2020).
141
See, e.g., In re Nolen, 65 B.R. 1014, 1014–16, 1018 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1986) (describing the treatment
of lump sum payments by various state courts); In re Willis, No. 93-31512-B, 1994 WL 69517, at *2–4 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 1994) (noting that workers’ compensation benefits are exempt and not limited a certain
amount); In re Jones, 446 B.R. 466, 474 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011) (final annuity lump sum payment fully exempt).
142
In re Greene, 178 B.R. 533, 537 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
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A. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
There are three changes that need to be made in the Code to better serve
disabled debtors. The changes would include defining a disability benefit in
section 101, modifying the opt-out scheme in section 522(b)(1), and redrafting
section 522(d).
1. Defining a Disability Benefit
The first step is to define a disability benefit in section 101 of the Code. The
term disability benefit can potentially implicate five different exemptions in
section 522(d) depending on the circumstances of the case. Defining disability
benefits in section 101 would clear up meaningful confusion in section 522(d).
The proposed definition would read:
(13B) The term “disability benefit” means a right to reasonable
payment that accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief
in a case under this title that is:
(A) a substitute to income when an individual cannot perform a
substantial amount of work due to injury or long-term illness
expected to last at least 12 months; and
(B) takes the form of an identifiable method of support.

2. Modifying the Opt-Out Scheme
Second, the opt-out scheme should be modified in section 522(b)(1). An
exception would be added to so that no state laws can change the disability
exemption system set out in the remainder of Section 522(d). The proposed
modification to Section 522(b)(1) is as follows:
Notwithstanding Section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either
paragraph 2, or in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this subsection
except for a disability benefit that meets the definition in 101(13B) in
which case a debtor may only use paragraph (3) of this subsection.143

This proposed statutory language would eliminate the state law exemption
scheme that causes confusion for disability benefits only.144 This modification
would create uniformity for disabled debtors by ensuring that courts must use
the exemptions in section 522(d) only. This would prevent courts from apply

143

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2019). The portion in italics is the proposed amendment.
The integrity of opt-out system for exemptions other than disability exemptions exceeds the scope of
this comment.
144
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state disability benefit exemptions that could be broader or narrower than the
federal exemptions, which leads to geographical discrimination depending on a
disabled debtor’s residency.
3. Redrafting Section 522(d)
Third, the statutory language of section 522(d) would be reworked. First, all
types of disability benefits would be grouped together, including private
disability benefits, worker’s compensation, and SSDI provided they meet the
definition of a disability benefit in proposed section 101(13B). The statutory
language will incorporate a general rule for future payments, past payments,
form, property purchased with the award, and any punitive elements. This
Subsection will discuss the proposed changes and then recommend statutory
amendments.
a. Form
The form of the disability benefit should not matter if the benefit meets the
proposed definition of a disability benefit in Section 101. The benefit could be
in the form of a lump sum settlement, annuity, monthly cash payments, or held
in a trust.
b. Future Payments
Next, future payments should be limited to an amount reasonably necessary
for support of the debtor. This would prevent any unreasonably large payments
from exemption. This would also prevent punitive components of awards from
exemption. Instead, any punitive element would be distributed as a part of the
estate. Limiting future payments is not only fair to creditors, but also follows
disability payment’s treatment under the Tax Code.145 Additionally, to combat
some of the temporal issues, if a debtor must wait for a payout between his injury
and his award, that time period should not be reduced. Since this portion of
disability benefits, regardless of form, generally covers expenses like medical
costs and lost wages for that period, it should not be reduced so that the debtor
can pay down those expenses. This distinction would not include any special
damages for that time period.

145
See PUBLICATION 907, TAX HIGHLIGHTS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
publications/p907 (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
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c. Past Payments
Under the new proposed system, previously paid funds under a disability
benefit plan would retain their exempt status. This treatment aligns all disability
benefits with SSDI.146 Exempting previously deposited funds prevents prebankruptcy planning of converting cash into exempt assets. This system further
rewards smart financial planning and rewards debtors who save. However, this
would not be the case for personal injury awards. The portion of a personal
injury award that represents the debtor’s physical disability and inability to keep
working should be exempt in the entirety. However, the remaining portion of the
award should be reduced according to the Personal Injury Exemption. Because
the source of funds itself is exempt, the funds should remain exempt until
converted into another asset. This strikes a fair balance between debtors and
creditors; a debtor may exempt the funds if they are still identifiable proceeds of
a disability benefit but may not once the award is converted to goods.
d. Property Purchased with a Disability Benefit
However, any exemption for property that is traceable to a disability benefit
would be discarded. The exemption for property traceable to an award can harm
creditors because a debtor could exempt her entire estate under certain
circumstances. For example, if the debtor was receiving disability benefits for
several years, a majority of the debtor’s estate could be exempt. The other
exemptions in section 522 offer the debtor sufficient protection outside of
section 522(d).147 Further, if the purpose of disability benefits is to serve as an
income substitute for a disabled individual, then the individual should be treated
the same as a non-disabled individual. Typical debtors cannot exempt their entire
estate simply because the goods were purchased using funds from their
paycheck.
e. Section 522(d) Amendments
All of these recommendations should be written into section 522(d). To start,
the word “disability” should be removed from section 522(d)(10)(C) and section
522(d)(10)(E) and a new section 522(d)(10)(F) that would encompass all
disability benefits should be created. The proposed new statutory language is as
follows:

146
147

See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 407 (West).
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (listing exemptions).
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(F) The debtor’s right to receive a Disability Benefit to the extent it is
reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and any dependent of
the debtor in any identifiable form
(i) including deposited funds previously paid out to the extent the
funds are identifiable proceeds of the debtor’s right to receive a
Disability Benefit;
(ii) excluding property that is traceable to the debtor’s right to
receive a Disability Benefit; and
(iii) this section does not limit an award of previously
unaccounted for Disability Benefits that represent general
damages.

This rework of section 522(d)(10) combats the confusion surrounding disability
benefits. Section 522(d)(11) would be left in its entirety, which covers workers’
compensation. If a workers’ compensation award qualifies as a Disability
Benefit under the newly proposed definition, then the court should use the newly
proposed section 522(d)(10)(F) exemption scheme. If the workers’
compensation award does not meet the definition, it should be placed under
section 522(d)(11). This treatment is the same for personal injury awards under
the Personal Injury Exemption. Specifically, if a personal injury award does not
compensate for a disability, is predominately punitive, or has no physical
element, then the award should remain under section 522(d)(11)(D).
This choice between two statutory options for workers’ compensation and
personal injury awards may not seem ideal given the current issues highlighted
by this Comment. However, the courts currently lack a definition for disability
benefits altogether. Thus, in creating such a definition, courts should place
disability benefits that meet the definition under the new proposed system while
classifying workers’ compensation and personal injury awards under the
exemptions set out for each issue.
In conclusion, these proposed statutory amendments would align the Code
with court decisions and treat all disability benefits equally. The amendments
would also allow the court to make an objective determination about the future
benefits and whether the benefits need to be limited. The proposed statutory
amendments solve the problem with disability benefits in multiple ways. First,
defining a disability benefit guides courts initially by allowing judges to
compare the benefit a debtor receives to the new definition. If the benefit falls
within the definition, the newly proposed section 522(d)(10)(F) applies. Further,
if the statutory opt-out scheme is eliminated, it would allow the court to
disregard any contrary state laws.
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IV. APPLICATION
This Section will walk Joe the debtor through the current system for
disability related benefits and through the new proposed system. This
application will demonstrate the new proposed system’s fairness, reliability, and
easy use.
Returning to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this comment, Joe
was injured at work and struggled to pay the bills. Joe file for bankruptcy. Under
the current system, if Joe is not receiving SSDI, his award has temporal,
placement, and form issues. Suppose Joe’s disability payments come from a
private disability policy and he receives $800 a month in the form of a check.
First, Joe does not know where the court will place his award. Will it be
categorized under the Disability Exemption, and be fully exempt, or under the
Contract Exemption, and reduced? The form of the award will also factor into
its categorization. If the award is money, the court is most likely to place it under
the Disability Exemption.148 If the award is in another form, then the court will
mostly likely place it under the Contract Exemption instead.149 Suppose Joe
saved $5,000 of his disability benefit before filing for bankruptcy relief. If the
saved funds were not exempt, would Joe use them to purchase exempt assets
rather than have the funds taken away by the court? The courts are split as to
whether goods purchased with disability benefits are exempt.150
Now, Bob. Suppose Bob received a workers’ compensation award, rather
than a private disability policy, and through that award, he was paid $800 per
month. Similar to Joe, Bob would not know how the court will classify the
award. Facing two possibilities, Bob’s award could be placed under the
Disability Exemption or placed under the Future Earnings. The form of Bob’s
workers’ compensation award may also matter. If the award is $800 in cash, then
the benefit will most likely fall under the umbrella of the Disability Exemption.
Alternatively, if the award is not cash, then the benefit is likely to be classified
within Future Earnings Exemption. Moreover, temporal issues also play into
your workers’ compensation award. Suppose that Bob received a lump sum
payout two years ago, rather than monthly payments. Some courts would allow
the award to remain exempt, while others would deem it to be too far in the past
148
See In re Cain, 91 B.R. 182, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (workers’ compensation benefits exempt
under Disability Exemption because they are statutorily designed as reasonably necessary for the debtor’s
support).
149
See In re Greenly, 481 B.R. 299, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (annuity payments debtor was entitled to
in connection with structured settlement arose out of contract and the debtor did not own the annuity herself, so
the court placed the award under the Contract Exemption rather than the Disability Exemption).
150
Supra notes 109–115 and accompanying text.
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for an exemption even if you kept the money segregated and refrained from
spending.151 Suppose instead, however, that Bob spent the money on other
property. In this scenario, such property is not exempt, absent some other
applicable exemption.152
Finally, Suzy. Suppose Suzy received a personal injury award, in a payment
of $30,000. Similar to private disability and worker’s compensation, Suzy would
not know where the court will place her award under these circumstances. The
court may place it under the Personal Injury Exemption or under the Future
Earnings Exemption, but, in either case, the award may also be reduced. Form
also plays into personal injury awards. For example, if Suzy’s award is not a
$30,000 check but is instead an annuity, then the award may be classified as
worker’s compensation. This may allow Suzy to keep more of the award over
time, rather than having the $30,000 reduced. However, if Suzy received the
$30,000 award in place of the annuity, then she would have an incentive to
convert the award into as much exempt property as possible, for the sake of
keeping the majority of the award.
Now as a comparison, suppose Joe was receiving $800 a month as a
disability benefit. Under the new proposed system, the source of Joe’s disability
benefit would not matter as long as it met the proposed definition. If Joe could
not perform a substantial amount of work due to injury or long-term illness
expected to last at least twelve months and the disability benefit took the form
of an identifiable method of support, Joe’s award would be classified as a
disability benefit. This new definition immediately eliminates any form issues,
so if the payments were not in a monthly check, it would not matter.
The new system also clears up any confusion on temporal issues. Any future
payments under Joe’s disability policy could be reduced by the court to the
amount reasonably necessary to support Joe. This is a compromise. The court
may reduce the award but is not required to. Further, this gives the court
discretion to consider the individual aspects of each case, such as anticipated
medical costs and potential to return to work. While future payments may be
reduced, the court may not limit any portion of an award that compensates the
debtor for the time between their injury and the award.
Under the new system, property that is traceable to the award is not exempt.
If Joe purchased any property with his award, the property would not be exempt.
This eliminates the possibility of debtors being able to exempt their entire estate
151
152

Supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2019) (listing exemptions).
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if all assets were purchased using the disability benefit. This unfairly
discriminates against creditors and would result in creditors refusing to extend
credit to any disabled individuals. This is not worth the risk. However, funds
previously paid and not yet spent are exempt. This promotes financial planning
by the disabled debtor.
Bob and Suzy have similar results to Joe under the proposed system. Bob’s
$800 workers’ compensation award would be classified as a disability benefit if
he could not perform a substantial amount of work due to injury or long-term
illness expected to last at least twelve months. The form of Bob’s worker’s
compensation would not matter if the benefit took the form of an identifiable
method of support. When Bob received his award would not matter either under
the proposed system. Suzy faces similar results to Joe and Bob. Her personal
injury award would be classified as a disability benefit if it met the definition,
regardless of whether it is a lump sum or an annuity.
While there are some tradeoffs in the proposed system, it is straightforward,
and a debtor would know the status of his disability benefit rather than guessing.
The new proposed system eliminates many of the pitfalls of the current system
but still allows the court to carefully consider each disabled debtor’s unique
situation.
CONCLUSION
The current exemption system for disability benefits needs to be amended.
First, the archaic opt-out system allowed states to write their own exemptions
and meddle with what is otherwise a uniform bankruptcy process. Even if states
are not allowed to opt-out of the federal exemptions, the exemptions are poorly
drafted, confusing, and difficult to apply. Given sparse source material, the
courts understandably struggle to apply the federal exemption system. The result
of this system is a disorderly and discriminatory system for disabled debtors.
Disabled debtors face numerous uncertainties about their disability benefits.
The court does not know which exemption to use for which type of disability
benefit, which affects if the award is reduced or exempt in full. The second
largest issue is temporal limitations. Are the future benefits exempt? What about
the current funds and assets purchased with the funds? Finally, what about funds
previously paid? Another issue is the form of the disability benefit. Courts do
not like benefits that are not paid in cash and allows form to play into
classification of the award.
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The new proposed system eliminates all three main issues courts currently
face. The proposed system eliminates confusion on classification by defining a
disability benefit and drafting a new exemption exclusively for disability
benefits. The new exemption and definition apply regardless of the source of the
disability benefit. The new definition eliminates any form issues. As long as the
disability benefit meets the definition, it is exempt regardless of form. Further,
the new system eliminates the confusion on temporal issues by creating clean
cut rules. Future payments may be reduced, funds retain their exempt status
when paid but property purchased with the funds does not. This strikes a balance
between creditors and debtors and will best serve disabled individuals in the
future.
Finally, the new system’s clarity is demonstrated by the application section.
Instead of confusion for the disabled debtor, a simplified system offers logical
rules that allow debtors to adequately plan and maximize the value of their estate
to the benefit of creditors. This system will enable disabled debtors to use the
bankruptcy courts in an orderly, fair, and predictable fashion.
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